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Abstract

protect American corporations and guide their strategic planning efforts by removing an enormous source
of uncertainty. Privacy policy has multiple objectives,
which sometimes conflict with each other. Making it
harder for governments to “crack” encryption protects
individual privacy by making arbitrary search by governmental agencies more difficult. However, this also
makes it more difficult for governments to detect and
monitor terrorist activities and thus makes it more
difficult to prevent terrorist attacks.
Moreover, we need a clear new privacy policy
that is harmonized globally. There are many reasons
why global harmonization is required. Individuals
need to understand their rights and the protections
available to them both at home and abroad. American
corporations should not placed at a competitive disadvantage by the US imposing more stringent requirements on data sharing with law enforcement and government agencies than those that are imposed on foreign corporations. European corporations should not
placed at a competitive disadvantage as a result of
unequal enforcement of privacy laws, which allows
American firms to operate in Europe in ways that are
both spectacularly profitable and illegal for European
corporations.
We begin by explaining why it is necessary to
change our regulatory regime. Section 2 explains the
importance of a new policy based on current technological capabilities, since existing regulations do not
address contemporary business practices. Section 3
lists the objectives that we believe should guide the
redesign of domestic American regulation. Section 4
explains that the problem is not new; regulatory
change frequently lags technologic evolution. Section
5 reviews why this truly is a problem, by exploring the
difficulties encountered when using historical precedent to resolve conflicts in the use of modern technology. Section 6 reviews The Big Four in current privacy litigation, cases involving Apple, Microsoft,
Google, and Facebook, which are without a doubt the
four largest providers of online software in the western world. Section 7 provides some guidelines for
developing new privacy policy, while section 8 provides our suggested policy. Finally, section 9 provides brief conclusions.

With dramatic changes in technology capabilities,
much of current privacy law in the US and abroad has
been rendered out of date. Analogies and precedents
are difficult to interpret, leading to decisions that are
inconsistent, problematic, or wrong. Searching the
text messages on an iPhone is not the same as overhearing a conversation. Searching an entire Facebook account for evidence of fraud is not the same as
searching a bank account. We review the lessons of
four current court cases involving online privacy and
develop a set of guidelines that could be used to develop coherent privacy policy. The guidelines were
developed with the expectation that they could confer
no advantage on firms in nation, and that they would
provide all citizens with the privacy protections no
less than those they enjoy in their home countries.
1.

Introduction to the Problems in Regulating
Online Privacy

Technological innovations are occurring at an unprecedented rate. These innovations expand the capabilities of individuals and legitimate businesses. They
also expand the capabilities of terrorists, terrorist cells,
and criminal organizations. And they expand the capabilities of governments, both friendly and hostile,
foreign and domestic. This alters the nature of threats
we all face, as well as the need for speed to detect and
prevent them. Augmented capabilities and changing
nature of threats requires a coherent response in public
policy, regulation, and law. This coherent response
must be agreed both at home and abroad, and coordinated with both foreign and domestic governmental
agencies. This challenges traditional regulatory
frameworks and limits the applicability of historical
analogies and legal precedents.
The United States needs a new and clear privacy
policy based on current technological capabilities,
current needs for legal protection, and current business
models and business practices. We need a privacy
policy based on the business environment as it exists
today and as it is likely to develop in the foreseeable
future. A privacy policy based on historical precedents and imprecise analogies will lead to legal decisions that are poor and are inconsistent across jurisdictions domestically and internationally. These decisions will be based on the idiosyncratic selection of
examples and analogies offered in each dispute, and
on the responses of individual courts.
We need a clear new privacy policy, to protect inURI:
http://hdl.handle.net/10125/50556
dividuals,
to guide the courts, and as importantly to
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2.

The Importance of a Clear New Policy Based
on Current Technological Capabilities and
Current Business Practices

Whenever possible regulation should be based on historical precedents. American jurisprudence is
based
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on constant evolution, as new situations arise, new
business practices arise, and new sources of conflict
and litigation arise. Historical precedent does not prevent evolution, but it places clear and deliberate limits
on the pace of change, providing stability, predictability, and in most cases fairness.
However, discontinuous change in technological
capabilities and in the business practices that they
enable do, indeed, create discontinuous changes. We
start by using well-known examples not selected from
the privacy domain. None were anticipated when the
original regulations were drafted, and, similarly, all
entail possibilities that were not envisioned and were
not relevant during the litigation of prior cases. Some
practices that might have been deemed as abusive in
earlier cases may not be abusive today. When there
were only three television networks, and a region
might have access to at most three stations, the Fairness Doctrine [10] was essential to ensuring that all
citizens had access to sufficient sources of information. With literally hundreds of broadcast and
online sources of information today, the Fairness Doctrine is no longer as critical. In contrast, the First
Amendment to the American Constitution [12], perhaps the most important of the amendments in the Bill
of Rights, places virtually no restrictions on freedom
of speech. The Founding Fathers, the drafters of the
American Constitution, were concerned with the ease
with which a government might silence all opposition
by seizing printing presses. They did not envision the
ease with which illegitimate voices, including agents
of foreign powers, might flood the US with online
fake news. Nor did they anticipate the speed with
which fake news from legitimate American sources
might be picked up and amplified, and used to distort
elections or to deliberately misinform the public. Lying for political advantage is not new. But the speed
with which technology can spread and amplify lies is
unprecedented.
Discontinuous change in business practices has
always resulting in discontinuous change in regulation. Small local proprietors could not influence the
supply or prices of most goods, and the invisible hand
of the market was quite sufficient to ensure efficient
operation, and to regulate supply and prices of both
goods and labor. In contrast, when the industrial revolution facilitated the emergence of massive vertically
and horizontally integrated corporations, antimonopoly laws and antitrust laws become essential to protect
both consumers and the competitive environment.
Small local producers sold their goods to their neighbors. Defective products, and most importantly, dangerous and unwholesome products, were more readily
detected, despite legends such as the tale of Sweeney
Todd. Mostly, you could not get away with selling
spoiled meats or contaminated milk to your neighbors.
Massive industrial manufacturing facilities, selling to
communities hundreds, or even thousands of miles
away, required inspection, resulting in the creation of

the Food and Drug Administration in 1906 [13]. Additionally, small local producers sold their goods to
their neighbors, and deceptive advertising and deceptive trade practices were readily detected. In contrast,
broadcast advertising created new opportunities for
deceptive claims, resulting in the creation of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 [11].
Technology has created situations that never existed before, creating legal paradoxes that never existed before. Current law prohibits mail carriers from
reading the contents of first class mail, and current
practice prohibits common carriers like Federal Express and DHL from opening sealed communications.
In contrast, there are few legal restrictions what
Google or other email service providers can do with
the contents of private messages that they deliver.
Moreover, the regulation of these paradoxes is not
consistent and is not always in the best interests of
consumers. The Japanese Constitution protects consumers from their telecommunications providers performing any form of data mining on the content of the
users’ communications. There were no such restrictions on Google as an email provider or search
provider, because when the Japanese Constitution was
drafted after World War II neither email nor online
search was anticipated as potential threats to individual privacy. Decades later Google was of course unregulated in Japan. Yahoo!, which was owned by a
company that also provided wireless telecommunications services, had numerous restrictions on how it
could use its users’ content for commercial purposes.
Rather than restrict Google to bring it in line with the
intent of the framers of the Japanese Constitution, the
restrictions of Yahoo!’s owner, Softbank, were
dropped. It is hard to imagine how this could be best
for Japanese consumers [36, 39].
It is also clear that current technology has created
threats to privacy of a scale that has never existed before. It is clear that online data integrators have prepared more complete profiles on individual consumers, their expected cost to serve, their expected willingness to pay, and all aspects of their purchasing behavior [14, 21, 41]. It has been shown by Ben Shiller
[35] and others that this information has now starting
to be used to increase the prices charged to specific,
identifiable, individual consumers.
Moreover, the legal remedies that have been offered do not address the problems of informed differential pricing adequately. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986 was intended to
provide the same degree of privacy protection for
email and other forms of electronic communications
that already existed to protect privacy from wiretapping [8]. Unfortunately, voice communications are
transient; you say something, and if it has not illegally
been recorded it is gone. In contrast, email can remain
in storage indefinitely. In the more than 40 years
since the act was drafted, our use of email has
changed dramatically; it is no longer analogous
to 5356
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use of telephony, nor is it analogous to our use of traditional mail. The bill is seriously outmoded [1, 11].
Many of the disputes that we discuss in section 6 are
in large measure based on different interpretations of
the ECPA. The digital right to be forgotten online has
been suggested as a mechanism to protect consumers
from the negative impacts of data mining and from the
negative impacts of inaccurate or irrelevant information [32]. Some form of the right to be forgotten
has already been introduced in the EU and South Korea, and several other jurisdictions are considering
introducing additional measures. While the right to be
forgotten does allow individuals to delete links to information stored online, so that they do not appear in
search results, the original articles still remain accessible on the net. More relevant to the issue we are
discussing here, data warehousing does not involve
doing a search for archival information. Rather, it
involves tracking your transactions, in real time, as
they occur, and integrating them across the broadest
possible range of sources. Removing links to one or
two articles will have no impact whatsoever on data
mining, data integration, and data warehousing. It
will have no impact on privacy violations, or on the
financial costs associated with precision pricing enabled by privacy violations.
The capabilities of data analysis, especially machine learning and big data analytics, are barely understood by experts today. They clearly were never
anticipated by prior legal scholars and they clearly are
not covered by historical legal precedent. Analysis of
Facebook “likes” has been shown to be sufficient to
infer vast amounts of information with a surprisingly
high degree of accuracy, including assessing personality traits [22, 27], and the ability to determine birth
gender and sexual orientation, religion, and political
affiliation. Similar uses have been found for other
sources of public information, even of the photo you
select for your Facebook wall. This can be combined
with data warehousing and used in an ever-increasing
variety of ways. Not all of the uses are beneficial to
consumers. Documented commercial uses include
discriminating against renters based on race or religion, discriminating in coverage availability or prices
for insurance applicants, and precision targeted marketing to children [6, 7, 30, 40]. Equally troublesome
is the potential for election manipulation, as indicated
by recent experience with the Brexit campaign and
with Trump’s recent presidential campaign [3, 37].
Most current corporate practices that address privacy are based on outmoded regulations, and when
modern corporate strategy and online business models
are regulated by rules developed in the 1960s or 1980s
the results are less than ideal for consumers. Attempts
to regulate one corporation by analogy with another in
a different industry, or with a regulatory policy designed for a different era, are unpredictable. Google is
permitted to read email, in ways that no carrier of traditional mail would be permitted. Google is permitted

to view your purchase history and use it commercially, in ways that no credit card issuer or financial services firm would be permitted to do. Google and Uber are permitted to monitor your geographic position
constantly, with persistence that would not be permitted for any employer, and indeed would not be permitted for law enforcement agencies without a courtordered tracking device. And yet each of the examples involves firms with only a limited slice of the
data available on any one of us. Moreover, each of
these firms has a sound business reason for wanting
the data they are gathering. Google does not charge
consumers for services they provide, and their use of
private information they capture is the basis of the
bulk of their profits. Uber could not predict demand
as well, and could not dispatch cars as quickly, if it
did not know the location of its passengers. In contrast, local internet service providers (ISPs) are now
permitted to view, store and analyze any and all data
that they transmit and to use it for commercial purposes, as a result of recent bill passed by the US Congress
[15]. In theory, without clarification and without
modification, this bill would allow your ISP to combine financial services data, texting and email, transmission of documents and photographs for storage in
the cloud, search history, and medical records sent to
you through secure portals, to create a portrait of you
in unlimited detail. This is permitted, despite the fact
that it is far broader than the data available to any other commercial enterprise. This is permitted despite
the fact that your ISPs have numerous other sources of
revenues and of profits. Google is not the right corporate analog for regulating Comcast and Verizon as
ISPs.
3.

Objectives of American Regulation

We see at least six objectives for privacy regulation in
the United States. Each objective seeks to protect a
different constituency.
Protecting the privacy of our citizens as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, prohibiting illegal search and seizure.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that in their homes
Americans are safe from search and seizure of property by the federal government, unless the government
can show cause and can obtain a valid search warrant.
By extension this now applies to search and seizure by
state and local governments. Government surveillance of our online activities should be governed by
the same rules that govern search of our physical
property, our mail, and our traditional telephony.
Protecting our citizens by apprehending and
convicting traditional criminals. The need to respond immediately to perceived terrorist threats may
sometimes require that the courts provide sweeping
investigatory powers, including electronic surveillance
of a suspect, all of his electronic communications, and
the electronic communications of all of his or her contacts.
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Protect the privacy of our citizens by not setting precedents that place them at risk from illegal
search by foreign governments. If the access that
the US government demands from US online service
providers are too great, this may create precedents that
can and will be used by foreign governments to demand corporate cooperation with their own surveillance activities. If the US can force an American
company to violate the norms of the countries in
which it operates and to provide data on foreign nationals in order to obey the wishes of the US government, does this set precedents for foreign governments
to demand similar concessions when investigating US
citizens?
Protecting the state from the activities of terrorists and enemies, foreign and domestic. Sometimes the US will need to access data quickly to prevent a terrorist attack, or to prevent the destruction of
evidence related to a past or planned future attack.
While suspected terrorists have rights in the US, for
example if they are US citizens, the courts should be
prepared to provide access to critical information almost immediately.
Protecting the interests of American corporations by not placing them at a strategic disadvantage relative to foreign competitors. If Microsoft and Google email accounts are seen as unsafe
for foreign nationals, this will accelerate the growth of
non-US competitors, including those who would not
normally be able to compete with Microsoft and
Google either in terms of price of services or in terms
of service quality. Given the importance of high tech
service providers to the US economy and to the US
balance of trade, actions that increase the attractiveness of foreign competitors can hardly be seen as in
the best interests of the US. Facebook is thriving in
the EU despite repeatedly violating EU privacy policies. If these consistent privacy violations were seen
as somehow supporting activities of the US government it is not clear that the population of the EU nations would be as tolerant of them. This one of the
few scenarios that could lead to replacing Facebook in
Europe with one or more local and locally regulated
alternatives.
Protecting the privacy of foreign nationals
from illegal search and seizure enabled by precedents established by US law enforcement. If the US
can demand access to data on US citizens, regardless
of where the data are located, and irrespective of the
local policies on search and privacy in the countries
where the data are located, then foreign governments
can do the same. A citizen who resides in the US and
uses US software providers might previously have felt
secure from illegal search and seizure. However, if
the US can demand that service providers deliver information on its citizens regardless of where they or
their data reside, presumably any other nation could
do the same.

4.

The Problem Drafting Appropriate Regulation
Is Not New — Regulation Frequently Lags
Technological Innovation

Technological innovation has frequently demanded a
reexamination of privacy policies, and of regulation
more generally.
American jurisprudence is based on historical
precedent and analogy, as well as law. That is, precedent and analogy go a long way towards governing the
interpretation of law. But analogies are imprecise, and
on occasion can lead to absurd decisions when using
them to interpret the application of old law to new
technologies.
It is generally accepted in American courts that no
warrant is needed when overhearing unguarded speech
over a cellphone. If a suspect says something out
loud, in public, in the presence of a police officer then
no warrant is required to “capture” that speech as evidence. The State of California tried to argue, in Riley
v. California, [33], that by analogy the police did not
require a warrant to view the text on a suspect’s cellphone during an arrest. Ultimately, after rounds of
appeals, the case was decided by the US Supreme
Court. The Court ruled that while a casual observer
can overhear speech, and there is no presumed right to
privacy when speaking in public, a casual observer
cannot read your texting history when you carry your
phone in public [2, 29]. Thus, a warrant is required to
search a suspect’s cellphone. However, while the ruling seems self-evidently correct, this dispute actually
reached the US Supreme Court before it was resolved.
Analogies, in the hands of skilled lawyers, are complex things and their interpretation can be unpredictable. Regulatory clarification would help make clear
what analogies are correct and what are not, and
where precedents are applicable and where they are
not.
Problems with applying existing regulations and
historical precedents to unfamiliar technology are not
new nor are they restricted to privacy. The evolution
of attempts to regulate AT&T over several decades
provides an instructive early example. AT&T was a
natural monopoly, perhaps the first significant natural
monopoly in business history. The more people connected to a network the more valuable the network
becomes; AT&T offered our first example of a positive participation externality, also called a network
effect. Moreover, with the more limited technology of
the late 1800s and early 1900s, people connected to a
different network, one not operated by AT&T, could
not communicate with people on the AT&T network.
Clearly, the bigger the AT&T network became the
more valuable it was to AT&T’s customers. Just as
clearly, customers who were on competitors’ networks
could communicate with fewer people, could not
communicate with the majority of Americans, and
received less value, even though their services cost as
much to provide. Thus, the fewer competitors that
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were operating in the US, and the more people who
relied upon AT&T for their telecommunications services throughout the US, the better off everyone
would be. It was not immediately clear how to deal
with a natural monopoly. Natural monopolies were
not covered adequately by either the Sherman Act
(which focused on heavy industry) or the Interstate
Commerce Act (which focused on rail networks rather
than telecoms networks). The Sherman Act was intended to prevent abuse caused by huge industrial
monopolies by limiting their growth and their increase
in market share. But with the telecommunications
technology that existed at the time, communications
across the boundaries of an individual company was
impossible. Hence the US actually needed and wanted a telecommunications monopoly. The Interstate
Commerce Act was designed to prohibit abuse of
farmers and rural shippers by prohibiting abusively
high prices on short haul traffic over monopoly lines;
a farmer’s cost for the first few miles shipping produce to Chicago might be as high or higher than the
cost of shipping it the rest of the distance to New York
[16]. There is no indication at AT&T was abusing
local service customers in order to facilitate long distance communications. Indeed, AT&T was overcharging for long distance communications (long
haul) and undercharging local service customers (short
haul), the very opposite of the problem that the Interstate Commerce Commission was created to address.
AT&T was subsidizing local subscribers, in order to
achieve the socially desirable goal of universal service, or universal access to the telecommunications
network. While it was clearly socially desirable to
move towards universal service, this, too, grew
AT&T’s market share and strengthened AT&T’s monopoly position. When neither the Sherman Act nor
the Interstate Commerce Act were appropriate for
regulating AT&T the Justice Department turned to
AT&T itself for guidance. The result was the Kingsbury Commitment [41] of December, 1913. This recognized AT&T’s role as a natural monopoly and indeed did nothing to weaken AT&T’s monopoly power
or reduce its market share. Instead, the Kingsbury
Commitment merely required AT&T to divest Western Union (the telegraph company) and required it to
stop acquiring small local telephone companies; in
exchange it was given complete control over its operations, subject only to a constraint on its total profitability. Unlike the UK, where telephony became a division of the national postal service, in the US AT&T
retained its status as a publicly traded company, subject to rules that limited the financial impact of its
monopoly power.
The next question regulators faced, two decades
later, was how to deal with platform envelopment after AT&T moved into network broadcasting. Platform
envelopment occurs when a company has significant
power and significant market share and profits from
one software element, usually an operating system or

other extensible platform. Platform envelopment entails integrating a sequence of additional, complementary software elements. When the integration is done
properly, the collection of elements has far more value
than the sum of the individual values. Moreover,
when done properly, the integrated collection cannot
be duplicated by other vendors because they lack one
or more critical components, such as Microsoft’s control over the desktop through Windows, or Google’s
control over the cellphone desktop through Android.
The user receives significant benefit, of course, which
appeals to regulators. Competitors can be excluded,
even destroyed, which regulators abhor. Markets
alone cannot determine how to restrain platform envelopment. Platform envelopment was not envisioned
when the Sherman Act was drafted. When AT&T
launched America’s first commercial radio station,
and began to expand it to create America’s first commercial broadcasting network, its control over long
distance communications would have allowed it to
block any other commercial broadcasting network.
This was the eventual justification for the creation of
the Federal Communications Commission, and for
forcing AT&T out of network broadcasting [41].
5.

The Big Four of Current Privacy Cases

There are four recent cases involving disputes between the US government, the FBI, the Department of
Justice, or other law enforcement organizations, and
the some of the world’s largest and most important
manufacturers of computer hardware or providers of
computer software.
The simplest case to resolve was a dispute between the Department of Homeland Security and Apple, over unlocking the iPhones of two dead terrorists.
A Federal judge in California ordered Apple to help
the FBI access the contents of San Bernardino shooter
Syed Farook's iPhone [23]. Apple refused, and their
CEO Tim Cook vowed to resist the court order [24].
Attempts to bypass Apple’s security are now risky,
since the phone automatically erases the phone's data
after too many unsuccessful attempts to unlock it.
Clearly the case is complex because of the need to
balance competing interests; in this case any decision
would need to balance protecting US citizens from
further terrorist attacks, which might have been imminent, protecting US corporations from the perception
that their customers’ data are readily available if the
Courts in the US demand it, and the need to protect
foreign nationals, whose own privacy might be placed
at risk by establishing the precedent of letting governments demand access to phone data. Because of
the threat to US corporations, Google’s CEO publicly
supported Apple’s position in this case [18]. The case
was easy to resolve only because the FBI was able to
find experts who were able to crack the phone for
them [31]. The dispute between corporate CEOs and
the FBI attempts to balance the needs of national security on the one hand against the corporate needs
Pagefor5359

commercially viable practices that protect individual’s
legitimate need for privacy. However, since the case
was never resolved in the courts, no legal precedent
has been established.
The dispute between Microsoft and the Department of Justice, over searching email stored in Ireland
using only a US Warrant, is more complex, and indeed is still unresolved [4]. The case turned on the
need for a valid Irish search warrant when searching
the email of an Irish national drug dealer whose records are controlled by Microsoft and stored in Ireland.
The DoJ argued that it did not matter where the data
were located, and that as long as Microsoft controlled
the data, anywhere in the world, it could be compelled
to produce the data for search. Microsoft argued that
although the data were in electronic form, and subject
to their control, the emails could not be produced
without a valid Irish search warrant. In 2016 Microsoft appealed, arguing that although the data were
in electronic form, demanding that they be produced
for US inspection was entirely analogous to the courts
attempting to search a customer’s paper files stored in
a Citibank safety deposit box in Ireland with nothing
but a US warrant. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals
decided that if the data were in Ireland, an Irish search
warrant was necessary. More recently, the same court
rejected a request from the Department of Justice for
an en banc rehearing of the case [“2nd Circuit denies
rehearing in Microsoft Ireland case by an evenly divided vote [19]. Once again, the decision balanced an
individual’s rights to privacy, the US legal system’s
rights to fully informed prosecution, the competitive
positioning of US information service providers, and
the implications for foreign nationals. Since the US
Department of Justice plans to appeal this case to the
US Supreme Court, it has yet net been fully resolved.
The dispute between Google and the FBI is more
complicated than the dispute between the Department
of Justice and Microsoft. The FBI demanded that
Google produce a large set of emails, and Google refused to provide some of them, arguing that the data
might not be stored in the United States at any given
time and that they could not be compelled to produce
the emails solely on the basis of a US search warrant.
They also cited the recent decision of the 2nd Circuit
Court of Appeals, ruling in favor of Microsoft. The
decision reached in the dispute was the opposite of the
decision in the Microsoft case, and has the potential to
create a contrasting decision that could limit the applicability of the Microsoft case. Magistrate Judge
Thomas Rueter of The US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania used two arguments to
justify finding a decision counter to the precedent of
the Microsoft case [20].
The first argument hinged on the nature of
Google’s decision on where to store individual email
messages in the cloud. It would be difficulty or even
impossible to determine which valid search warrant or
warrants are required when searching the email of

American nationals, accused of crimes committed in
the US, when even Google does not know where the
data are stored. This argument also makes clear that
storing the data of an Irish national in Ireland is fundamentally different from storing the data of a US
national anywhere and everywhere, and this could be
done explicitly to make search impossible.
The second argument appears, on its face, to be
clearly absurd. Judge Rueter argued that it does not
matter how the FBI obtains the emails that it demanded, and it does not matter from where in the world the
data were obtained, because the data are not going to
be examined until they reach the US. There thus
would be no privacy violation and no illegal search or
seizure, because the data are not obtained by the FBI
until they have reached the United States. Thus by
definition there is no illegal search because no privacy
is violated until the data are examined in the US,
where the warrant is legal.
Both Google’s argument and the decision of
Judge Rueter would provide dangerous precedents if
upheld. Google’s argument, if accepted, would allow
software companies to avoid all warrants simply by
moving data throughout the cloud constantly, so there
is no single place to search and no warrant or set of
warrants that would compel the company to submit
the data that had been demanded. Judge Rueter’s second argument, if accepted, would allow US courts to
perform search and seizure, anywhere in the world, as
long as the documents were not examined until they
reached the US, even if these searches were illegal in
the jurisdictions in which they were performed. Indeed, by extension, US agents could seize physical
documents from a locked deposit bank or safe anywhere in the world, provided they had a warrant in the
US, and provided no one looked at the documents
until they had arrived in the US.
The current litigation involving search of Facebook data is fundamentally different from the other
cases, because Facebook’s argument is not that the
warrant is illegal because of the location of the data
but because of the scope of the court’s request [28].
Quoting from the decision, “In July 2013, [New York
State] Supreme Court issued 381 warrants directed at
Facebook upon a warrant application by the New
York County District Attorney's Office that was supported by an investigator's affidavit. The warrants, …,
sought subscriber information and content from numerous user accounts … .”
This was a request for all the data on these 381
Facebook accounts, including friends lists, photographs, postings, and virtually all data associated with
each account. In general, a search warrant needs to be
specific about what the object of the search is, and
what the authorities expect to find. This request was
so broad that Facebook felt that it was more like a
subpoena, a request to produce everything that might
be relevant. However, while subpoenas can be challenged, search warrants cannot. The article in
the 5360
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New York Times explains: “But Judge Leslie E. Stein,
writing for the majority, said state courts had held for
decades that search warrants issued by judges cannot
be appealed to a higher court. Instead, they may be
challenged by a defendant only during a pretrial hearing, as illegal searches.” Since the judge held that
warrants can’t be appealed, the court therefore did not
need to rule on Facebook’s central argument, that the
warrants were so broad that they should have been
viewed as unconstitutional search.
Lower courts had argued that “Facebook, as a
service provider, could not argue the searches were
unconstitutional on behalf of its clients, any more than
a landlord could stop the police with a warrant from
searching a storage facility. Since the court did not
rule on Facebook’s argument, this leaves unresolved
the issue of just how broad and invasive an electronic
search can be. Searching an individual’s safety deposit box for specific documents can produce at most a
limited amount of information, which must be covered
by the warrant to be used as evidence. Searching an
individual’s hard drive for specific information, likewise falls within the scope traditionally permitted for a
warrant. Searching an individual’s Facebook account
for everything accessible may represent a substantial
deviation from the scope of traditional warrants.
Only the Google case and Facebook case appear
to create interesting and potentially problematic precedent. Both cases suggest that an update of the 1986
ECPA may be overdue.
6.

Some Suggested Guidelines for Developing
New Regulatory Policy

The most basic principles should govern the development of new policy.
• It should always be possible for the courts, for law
enforcement, and for national security agencies to
get data for which there is a valid need, and to obtain it in a timely fashion when necessary to prevent criminal acts or acts of terrorism.
• Demands for data should always be subject to appropriate review.
The first suggests that locating data where it cannot possibly be subject to search with a valid warrant
cannot be tolerated — e.g., if a service provider locates data on an artificial island, or in a safe data haven not subject to any MLATs (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties), then domestic law applies. Even here
there is significant ambiguity. Whose domestic law
should apply? The law of the country in which the
service provider has its home office? The law of the
country in which the service provider contracted with
the customer? The law of the customer’s home country? Likewise, the first principle suggests that encrypting data so that no one, not even the service provider, can access the data for any reason is a threat
both to judicial proceedings and to national security.
This suggests the need to address two separate but

related concepts, data citizenship and data sovereignty.
Data citizenship refers to where the data are assumed to reside. When data are located in a specific
location for reasons of performance, or to conform to
national law about the retention of data relevant to a
country’s citizens, then that is the country of the data’s
citizenship. When data are located in no particular
country and move around within the cloud, or when
data are located in countries specifically to avoid surveillance, harmonized international standards need to
be developed to determine whether the data has citizenship, or is in some sense stateless. Data sovereignty will be the rules governing which states have control over data that possesses its citizenship, and how to
govern access to data that is in some sense stateless.
The second principle suggests that blanket warrants for data, without specifying the object of the
search or the relevance of those objects to specific
litigation, can only be used in the most restricted of
cases.
The next section suggests policy, including some
rules for harmonization.
7.

Suggested Policy

There is a small set of actions that could easily be taken by all technology services companies and email
providers. These actions would ensure that the outcome of a case would not be determined by delay
caused by properly pursuing appropriate venues,
simply by preserving potentially relevant evidence
while warrants were pursued. Thus, no country would
ever need to argue that in the absence of rapid search,
including search of questionable legality, necessary
email evidence would be lost forever. While this
would not alter the need for speed in counter-terrorism
operations, it would essentially nullify the arguments
used by the Department of Justice in this case. The
Congress should pass legislation that would make
these actions mandatory for all service providers operating in the United States.
First, all email service providers around the world
should be required to maintain backups of all email
correspondence as soon as they receive a suitable official notification of an investigation anywhere in the
world for which this email is material evidence and an
official request for assistance in obtaining a valid
search warrant. We are aware that backups are usually available, but this ensures that any email that was
available at the time of notification would always remain available at the time the service provider received a valid warrant. This does not require the service providers to respond to a warrant from a foreign
jurisdiction. It does require the service provider to
maintain and protect archival data until such time as
the case is resolved or the relevant jurisdiction where
the data resides has issued a warrant. If such a valid
warrant is issued, then and only then is the company is
required to provide the data covered by the warrant.
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Global harmonization is essential in regulating
data services providers, just as it was in regulating
securities trading, to avoid what well-regulated exchanges called “the race to the bottom in securities
regulation.” Regulatory harmonization in traditional
industries likewise ensures that no country’s manufacturers or service providers are placed at a disadvantage
by adhering to stricter rules and so that no country’s
manufacturers or service providers gain a competitive
advantage by being held to laxer rules. Thus, countries will not be able to compete through regulatory
laxness. In the 1980s, during the early days of linked
securities markets and global securities trading, there
was considerable concern that competition among
global trading centers would inevitably lead to competition to see which market could provide the least restrictive trading rules, often called competition
through regulatory laxness and “a race to the bottom”
[26]. If international norms in data privacy regulation
are to be respected, then no nation should provide
limited oversight simply for competitive advantage for
its own service providers.
We need clear and unambiguous rules for establishing rules data citizenship and data sovereignty.
Data citizenship tells us where the data resides for
purposes of control, and data sovereignty tells us who
determines what rights are allowed when accessing
the data from anywhere in the world. Determining
data citizenship will sometimes be straight-forward.
When the service provider is located in the same jurisdiction as the data and as the data’s owner, then
unambiguously the data are presumed to have citizenship in that single country. Data citizenship is sometimes more complex. When the data and the data’s
owner are located in the same jurisdiction, but this is
not the home location of the service provider, where
should the data be presumed to have citizenship? By
analogy with physical documents and physical search,
we would assume that the data have citizenship in the
country where they are stored. Any agent wishing to
search the data would need to follow the rules of that
country, again by analogy with physical search. If a
German citizen stored documents in an office of an
American bank located in Germany, a German warrant would be required for search, even though the
data are located with an American firm. However,
there will be occasions when, as a result of technical
design or deliberate policies, data may appear to be
stateless, as would occur if the data were stored in
non-geosynchronous near-earth orbit, or more plausibly in a data center on an artificial island. Equivalently, the data might be deliberately stored in a data center in a rogue state with no MLATs. In this case the
data might be treated as if it had the citizenship corresponding to the location of the service provider’s
home office, simply to ensure that no service provider
maneuvered for competitive advantage by seeking to
establish stateless data.
Data sovereignty tells us who is allowed to access

data with an appropriate warrant. For data with clearly established citizenship, rights of data sovereignty
are held by the country of the data’s citizenship. The
rights of sovereignty imply the application of that
country’s rules for search. MLATs can be negotiated.
Additionally, given the ease with which cross border
searches can be performed, countries may choose to
extend the right of search to trusted allies, may choose
to create expedited electronic MLATs (eMLATs), or
may choose to leave traditional MLATs in place.
When data are stateless, the rights of data sovereignty
might be presumed to reside with the country where
the service provider was located.
8.

In Conclusion

Each of the four cases teaches us something different about privacy.
The Apple iPhone. The Apple iPhone dispute
teaches us that there are indeed times when access to
data may be urgently needed to avert an act of terrorism or other acts of mass violence. The devices of
suspects may be searched with an appropriate warrant,
and cooperation from hardware or software vendors
should be compelled under these limited circumstances.
The Microsoft Email Warrant. Microsoft’s
dispute with the Department of Justice teaches us that
whenever possible warrants for search of electronic
documents should be consistent with the rules governing traditional search warrants. When data has foreign
citizenship and a foreign country exercises legitimate
data sovereignty, warrants should be obtained from
the country with sovereignty.
The Google Email Warrant. Google’s dispute
with the FBI teaches us a lesson that is orthogonal to
the lesson of the Microsoft case, but does not contradict it in any way. When documents are stored in such
a way as to render them stateless, then international
agreements and harmonized standards are required, if
for no other reason than to preclude the tortured reasoning of the judge in this case. Regardless of what
agreements are eventually reached, when the home
country of the service provider with control of the
data, the home country of the individuals who own the
data, and the location of the alleged offense that justified issuing of the initial warrant are all the same, then
the warrant should be considered valid and the search
should be allowed to proceed.
The Facebook Warrant. Finally, the Facebook
search warrant case teaches us that it is too easy to
demand anything and everything with an electronic
search, without establishing in advance what you are
seeking to find. Warrants are not subpoenas and they
cannot be contested or appealed to a higher court before complying. They have traditionally required
specification of what is being searched, what is being
sought, and why. This principle should be applied to
warrants for the search of electronic media.
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